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I. Introduction 
 
At the beginning of the 2006 legislative session, two property rights concerns 
were at the forefront of the legislative agenda. The first was protecting residential 
property owners from the abuse of eminent domain law by local governments. The 
Supreme Court case that brought this issue to national attention was Kelo v. City of 
New London (2005) (Kelo). The issue in Kelo arose when the city of New London, 
Connecticut used the power of eminent domain to condemn nonblighted residential 
property for economic development. This was perceived by the public to be an abuse 
of the power of eminent domain. However, the Supreme Court found New London 
had not abused its authority. The second property rights concern was regulatory 
takings. Some Georgians have long held the belief that local governments have 
overstepped their bounds in implementing regulations regarding the use of private 
property, particularly for required stream buffers (Crawford 2006). A bill was 
introduced that would make it easier for property owners in Georgia to collect 
compensation due to laws and regulations that diminished the value of their real 
property.  
The Georgia legislature passed a bill curbing the power of eminent domain 
for local governments. However, the regulatory takings bill did not pass.1  This report 
discusses the two strands of property rights advocacy: regulatory takings and eminent 
domain. Georgia’s experience is compared with other states. The fiscal effect of the 
proposed regulatory takings legislation and the eminent domain reform is also 
examined. 
 
                                                          
1 Regulatory takings by definition are violations of the Fifth Amendment and require 
compensation, thus throughout the rest of this report regulatory taking will be used without 
referring to compensation.   
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II. Regulatory Takings 
 
Countrywide eminent domain legislation garnered much media and public 
attention after the Kelo decision. However, a second issue that private property rights 
advocates have been working on at the state level, regulatory takings, has the 
potential for a much larger fiscal impact at the state and local level. States have 
passed various regulatory takings reform measures that provide greater protection for 
private property owners from local government action. These measures provide a 
higher level of protection than the regulatory takings standard set out by the federal 
courts.  Regulatory takings reform can have a significant effect on local government 
planning and land use policy. This section will review the basics of regulatory takings 
law as well as selected state initiatives to revise these takings standards.  
 
History of Federal Takings Law 
The federal prohibition against government taking private property without 
compensation is found in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
This doctrine has been expanded to include regulations that rise to the same level as a 
physical occupation of private property by government.  
A regulatory taking occurs when a government action, law or regulation has 
such an extreme effect on private property that it is as if the government has 
exercised its right of eminent domain and thus must compensate the property owner.  
This idea was first espoused by Justice Holmes in the now famous case, Pennsylvania 
Coal v. Mahon (1922). A regulatory taking is also called an inverse condemnation, or 
more generally a taking.  
The Supreme Court has developed two clear standards to determine whether a 
regulatory taking has occurred. The first is if the regulation entails an actual physical 
invasion of property (Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp 1982) 
(Loretto). For instance in Loretto, a New York state statute allowed cable television 
operators to install cables and switch boxes on the rooftops of apartment buildings for 
a $1.00 fee. The statute was deemed a taking and  required compensation to the 
building owner under the physical invasion standard. The size of the switch boxes 
and cables was not relevant. The second standard is if the regulation effectively limits 
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all economically viable use of the property (Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 
1992) (Lucas). In Lucas, the Supreme Court held that South Carolina’s Beachfront 
Management Act constituted a taking because it prohibited the owner of two 
beachfront lots from constructing one single family home on each lot. The Beachfront 
Management Act was deemed to deprive the property owner of all economically 
viable use of the property.  
If these two standards are not met, the court instructs that a balancing 
approach be taken in which the character of the government regulation must be 
considered in relation to the economic impact of the action.  How the action interferes 
with distinct investment backed expectations must also be examined (Penn Central 
Transportation v. New York City 1978). The federal standard to prove that a 
regulatory taking has occurred is generally considered difficult to meet (Trevarthen 
2004).   
Historically this high federal standard, combined with the local police power, 
allowed local governments wide latitude in their planning and regulation of land use. 
Courts regularly differed to the local legislative body when challenges to land use and 
planning statutes came before them. Some states and local governments have used 
this combination of police power and judicial deference to pass sweeping land use 
planning and growth management statutes. Perhaps the best-known example is 
Oregon. Another state with comprehensive land use and planning statutes is Florida.  
Both states have recently seen successful campaigns to reign in this planning 
legislation. The examples of Florida and Oregon will be discussed later in the report.  
 
Property Rights Reform  
The increase in environmental and land use regulatory activity at the state and 
federal level during the 1970s was not universally popular. By the mid-1980s, 
initiatives backed by citizens, as well as industries that rely on the availability of real 
property, such as developers and agriculturalists, filed cases and supported initiatives 
to curb some of the recent environmental protections and planning requirements 
(Trevarthen 2004). These efforts at the federal level languished. However at the state 
level, these initiatives proved to be much more successful. Over the past fifteen years, 
Property Rights Reform:  A Fiscal Analysis   
 
 
 4 
twenty states have passed legislation that gives additional protection to the rights of 
private property owners from government regulation (Trevarthen 2004).2 
Regulatory takings reform legislation has generally come in two forms. The 
first is an assessment requirement, modeled after the National Environmental 
Protection Act. Governments are required to assess the impact of land use and 
environmental regulations on private property rights. The government must also 
identify alternative regulations that would be less burdensome on those rights. This 
type of assessment statute was adopted in the majority of states (Trevarthen 2004). 
The second type of reform legislation defines new standards for determining 
when a regulatory taking has occurred. These statutes define the level of acceptable 
burden regulations can have on private property before compensation is required. The 
standards are considerably lower than the federal standard, making recovery under a 
regulatory taking claim easier. These compensation statutes have been adopted in the 
minority of states including Florida and Oregon (Trevarthen 2004). 
With much lower burdens of proof to establish a regulatory taking, the second 
type of reform statutes can have a chilling effect on local planning and land use 
regulation (Trevarthen 2004 and Stevens 2002). It can also allow developers to have 
additional leverage in negotiations with local governments by threatening to sue 
under these statutes (Trevarthen 2004). In addition, these statutes may impose higher 
costs on residents, such as higher taxes to pay the compensation for regulatory 
takings, or less land use planning and regulation than the majority of residents would 
prefer. Opponents of these statutes claim that negative spillovers can occur as 
governments are precluded from exercising control over the siting of noxious 
industries such as mines, cement plants, or meat processing (Egan 2006 and Peters 
2005). 
The law that attempted to alter the way regulatory takings are defined in 
Georgia did not pass. However, it is likely that Georgia will see takings legislation in 
another form. Thus, it is worthwhile to examine the experiences of Oregon, Florida, 
and South Carolina. Each has a different type of planning statute as well as property 
                                                          
2 They include Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. 
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rights regime.  The two most prominent are in Florida and Oregon. Georgia’s 
regulatory environment is more stringent than South Carolina’s but is less restrictive 
than that of Oregon and Florida. Therefore, how revisions of regulatory takings law 
in Georgia affects the state is likely to fall between the experiences of South Carolina 
and Florida or Oregon. The next section looks at the regulatory takings reform 
experiences of Florida, Oregon and South Carolina. 
 
Florida Harris Act  
Comprehensive planning laws have existed in Florida since the 1970s.  
Florida law mandates that local government plans explicitly include three elements: 
traffic management, open space preservation, and housing provision. Growth 
boundaries are an available planning option (Williams 2004). Also, local 
governments must engage in concurrency management.  Concurrency management is 
intended to maintain the same level of public service standards and facilities as laid 
out in an area’s current comprehensive plan.  Thus, if additional development is 
approved and built that does not have public services or has the effect of reducing 
public service levels to existing development, additional infrastructure must also be 
approved and constructed either simultaneously or within a reasonable time.  The 
infrastructure must maintain the original public service levels in the entire area 
(Williams 2004). 
The Bert J. Harris Act (Harris Act) was passed in 1995 in an effort to lighten 
the burden imposed on property owners by the Florida planning statutes. The Harris 
Act was a compromise between entrenched environmental interests and newly 
powerful private property rights advocates (Jurgensmeyer 1996).3  The act provides 
that if a local government passes any rule or regulation that establishes an “inordinate 
burden” on private property, the government must compensate the landowner (Fla. 
Stat § 70.001(3) (e) (1995).  While it is not clear what qualifies as an “inordinate 
burden,” the legislature intended for property owners to be able to recover damages 
more frequently under this act than they did previously under the federal standard. 
The legislative history states that the Harris Act is to provide for a new cause of 
                                                          
3 The alternative may have been a state constitutional amendment (Jurgensmeyer 1996). 
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action for property owners in addition to traditional takings (Jurgensmeyer 1996). In 
addition, the Harris Act allows local governments and aggrieved parties to negotiate a 
settlement that may exempt the “inordinately burdened” property from the offending 
law. Such settlements must be filed and approved by the circuit court.  These 
settlements also have the potential to circumvent the intent of local governments and 
the residents of the area (Jurgensmeyer 1996).  
Despite the act’s significant changes to the prior law, very few cases have 
been brought (Trevarthen 2004). Some commentators suggest that the act has had a 
chilling effect on legislation (Trevarthen 2004 and Stevens 2002). Without clear 
guidance from the statute or the courts, local governments are reticent to put forth 
new legislation that could generate claims under the Harris Act. Such claims generate 
a no-win situation for the government due to the expense of defending against a 
Harris Act claim as well as the threat of a damage award. In addition, developers 
have been able to threaten suits under the act and coerce local governments to agree 
to variances and exceptions to current land use and planning statutes (Trevarthen 
2004). 
Despite the above concerns, Florida’s experience with property rights reform 
has been relatively benign (Trevarthen 2004). Several factors contribute to this effect. 
First, the Harris Act is prospective only, that is it applies only to new regulations. 
Second, Florida already had a statewide comprehensive plan in place with universal 
local compliance.  Third, modifications to existing plans are not considered new 
legislation and thus have not been challenged under the Harris Act (Fishkind & 
Associates 1998). The experience in Oregon with property rights reform has been 
considerably more contentious.  
 
Oregon Measure 37 
Oregon passed comprehensive land use planning legislation in 1973. It is 
considered by some to be the strongest in the nation (Hunnicutt 2006). The legislation 
requires that local land use plans and laws comply with specific state planning goals. 
The goal that proved the most onerous to some longtime residents is the requirement 
that rural lands be designated either farmland or forestland. The farm or forest land 
designation makes it very difficult for property owners to pursue other uses. 
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Prohibited uses include building new residential dwellings on the property.  An 
inability of owners to build new homes for themselves on their property sparked the 
drive to change the land use laws through a compensation statute (Hunnicutt 2006).4 
 The backlash against Oregon’s land use controls took the form of 
referendums, called Measures, and attempts at legislative changes.  Measure 7 was 
passed by voters in 2000, but was struck down by the Oregon courts. The legislature 
also failed in 2001 and 2003 to devise legislation acceptable to property rights 
advocates and planning proponents. Measure 37, the latest property rights initiative, 
was approved by the electorate in 2004. However, it was held up in the Oregon courts 
until 2006 (Hunnicutt 2006).  
Measure 37 provides both prospective and retroactive relief for property 
owners. The retroactive section provides relief for residents who have continuously 
owned property before the 1973 land use laws were passed.  The landowner must be 
compensated if she can show that local land use laws have diminished the fair market 
value of her property. If the local government cannot compensate the owner, the 
application of the offending land use measure must be waived. Prospectively, 
Measure 37 requires that property owners be compensated for any new laws that 
diminish the fair market value of their private property (MacLaren 2006).   
Measure 37 has caused confusion throughout Oregon as to the future 
application of community land use laws and plans. While the measure requires 
compensation for landowners, it provides no source of funds for local governments to 
respond to claims or pay them. Certainly not all claims are valid. The Oregon law 
requires that diminution of fair market value, due to the offending law, be supported 
by evidence such as, appraisals or expert opinion. But since most small local 
governments have no funds to dispute an asserted loss in fair market value or pay any 
claim regardless of value, they just waive the land use rule for all claimants 
(MacLaren 2006).  
                                                          
4 Dorothy English, a 93 year old widow, did several commercials for measure 37 and epitomized 
this problem. She has owned 20 acres overlooking Portland since 1953. She has been fighting the 
Oregon planning process for over 30 years to build several homes on her property, including one 
for her grandson (Hunnicutt 2006).  
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For those areas in Oregon that have dedicated funds to deal with Measure 37 
claims, the implementation cost is likely to exceed official estimates. A statement of 
the estimated fiscal effect was filed with Measure 37 prior to the election in 2004. 
The estimated fiscal cost to the state for administrative expenses for responding to the 
claims was $18 million to $44 million annually. The estimated value of claims filed 
with local governments seeking compensation was $44 million to $300 million 
annually (1000 Friends of Oregon 2006).  These estimates are likely to be low. The 
estimated value of the 2006 claims filed in Portland alone is approximately $250 
million (Budnick 2006). Statewide, Oregon has received approximately 6,500 claims 
prior to the December 4, 2006, filing deadline under the retroactive section of 
Measure 37 (1000 Friends of Oregon 2006).   
There is still much uncertainty as to how the majority of Measure 37 claims 
will be handled. Oregon must now attempt to balance the competing demands of its 
statewide comprehensive land use plans and Measure 37’s requirements for 
compensation or a waiver of such plans. The Governor and the Legislature will 
attempt to tackle the issue in the 2007 legislative session. The next section examines 
the experience of South Carolina. Unlike Florida and Oregon, South Caroling had 
very little in the way of comprehensive state or local planning and land use controls 
when it tried to implement property rights reform.   
 
South Carolina House Bill 3591 
In 1998, South Carolina attempted to pass House Bill 3591, a law very similar 
to the Harris Act in Florida. However, South Carolina’s land use laws and planning 
statutes were considerably less developed than Florida’s were in 1995 when the 
Harris Act passed. South Carolina essentially had no statewide planning laws in place 
and counties varied dramatically in their level of zoning and planning laws (Fishkind 
& Associates 1998).   A  coalition of citizens’ organizations commissioned Fishkind 
and Associates  
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(Fishkind), a prominent Florida economics consulting firm, to study the implications 
to the state and its residents of passing House Bill 3591.5  
The report’s conclusions were fairly dramatic. The estimated first year cost of 
the act to state and local governments and landowners was $126 million due to 
additional litigation (Fishkind & Associates 1998). In addition, South Carolina cities 
and counties might lose the ability to protect historic sites or plan for growth because 
they lacked the funds to compensate property owners (Fishkind & Associates 1998).  
The bill did not pass but attempts to revive the statute are still made (Stevens 2002).  
While South Carolina House Bill 3591 essentially mirrored the Harris Act and was 
prospective only, its experience with litigation due to House Bill 3591 was not likely 
to be that of Florida. 
The South Carolina estimated costs for litigation under the proposed act are 
large for several reasons. First, South Carolina required reauthorization of state and 
local plans in 1999. It was believed that the reauthorizations would be considered 
new law under the act and subject to claims (Fishkind & Associates 1998).  Second, 
the low level of planning and zoning that existed in 1998 in many of South Carolina’s 
46 counties. In 1998, twenty-two counties had no zoning regulations and 17 counties 
had no subdivision rules (Fishkind & Associates 1998). If these unregulated counties 
were to add zoning or planning, it would likely result in litigation under the act. It is 
reasonable to expect landowners to sue to protect the rights given to them under 
property rights legislation. This was the experience in Oregon when thousands of 
landowners rushed to file claims to secure their newly created rights under the 
retroactive provisions of Measure 37, as described above. The next section describes 
in detail the methods used by Fishkind to generate the estimates in its report. The 
methods are slightly modified and applied to Georgia to generate an estimated cost if 
similar legislation were to pass.  
 
                                                          
5 The Report was commissioned by “Beat the Burden” Coalition. Coalition members included: 
The American Planning Association, South Carolina Chapter; the Historic Charleston Foundation; 
The League of Women Voters of South Carolina; The Municipal Association of South Carolina;  
the National Trust for Historic Preservation; the South Carolina Association of Counties; the 
South Carolina Downtown Development Association; and the South Carolina Wildlife Federation. 
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III. Fiscal Impact of Proposed Takings Reform Legislation in 
Georgia 
 
In Georgia it is unclear what would qualify as a regulation or law that would 
trigger a claim under the proposed 2006 law, Senate Bill 30. Sponsors of the bill 
asserted zoning would not trigger a claim under the law. Opponents of the law 
claimed that no language specifically excluded zoning (Peters 2005). It was also 
unclear whether local planning initiatives would trigger a cause of action under the 
new law.  It is clear from the legislative history that stream buffers and other 
environmental requirements were the targeted regulations that would trigger a claim 
under the proposed legislation (Peters 2005).  
Senate Bill 30 did not pass. At the time of writing this report, it is not known 
what form future property rights legislation will take in Georgia. Thus, to be able to 
estimate fiscal effects, reasonable assumptions must be made. For this analysis, I will 
assume a new Georgia property rights law that is functionally equivalent to House 
Bill 3591 from South Carolina. Whatever action triggered a claim under the South 
Carolina bill would also trigger a claim in Georgia. Thus, any government action that 
creates an inordinate burden on private property could trigger a claim under the act 
(Fishkind & Associates 1998).  The litigation costs estimated by Fishkind were 
reviewed, at our request, by lawyers in 2006 and deemed reasonable to apply to 
Georgia. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, estimation procedures and cost elements 
are the same as those used by the Fishkind expert panel. To keep the various cost 
estimates more manageable, 1998 values will be used throughout the report. Only the 
final estimated costs will be adjusted for inflation.  
Fishkind's method for estimating the potential cost for the South Carolina bill 
involved three steps. The first step was to estimate the costs per claim both for the 
property owner filing the claim and for the government to respond to it. The second 
step was to estimate the number of claims filed under the act in its first year of 
existence. The third was to estimate litigation expenses. 
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Estimated Costs to File a Claim 
To estimate the costs per claim, Fishkind impaneled a group of experts 
including: lawyers, tax assessors, appraisers, and government officials. The panel 
estimated a range of costs for claims for loss of property values generated by the act. 
These estimates were in the form of cost distributions, giving a minimum value, 
maximum value and a midpoint. Fishkind had instructed the panel that the 
distribution of costs should cover 90 percent of potential claims filed under the act. 
The midpoint was used to calculate the expected value for the cost of a typical claim.  
The first steps in recovering lost value under a Georgia proposed property 
rights statute are to determine the amount of damages and to file a notice of claim. To 
ascertain the amount of damages to property due to a burdensome law or regulation, 
an appraisal is needed. The appraisal must demonstrate the loss of fair market value 
due to the regulation. The appraisal needs to account for values before regulation and 
after. To properly assess these values input may be required from experts such as: 
engineers, hydrologists, and economists.  
The South Carolina panel determined the minimum cost for the landowner to 
complete this step in the process would be $2,500 while the maximum would be 
$60,000. The minimum and maximum are expected to capture 90 percent of the 
cases. Thus it is possible that five percent of the cases will cost less than $2,500 and 
five percent will cost more than $60,000.6  The midpoint for this distribution was 
estimated to be $6,250. This midpoint is the value used to calculate the estimated cost 
in South Carolina. I adopt this value for Georgia. Throughout the rest of this section 
the cost estimates will be generated by the same procedure. 
The South Carolina law required a written settlement offer be made to a 
claimant within 180 days. The estimated costs to the county governments are listed in 
Appendix A. The low estimate to prepare this written offer within the proscribed time 
frame was $250, the high was $31,500. The panel estimated the midpoint for these 
costs to be $3,175. I use this estimate as well for Georgia. 
 
 
                                                          
6 The South Carolina panel based their midpoint estimation on a poison distribution of the costs.   
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Estimated Number of Claims Filed 
Total cost depends on the number of claims filed. New development is 
assumed more likely to generate claims under the proposed act due to the acts 
prospective application. To proxy the amount of new development, Fishkind used 
county level real-estate sales data as well as county characteristics. Fishkind also 
reviewed this method with the expert panel to ensure it was a reasonable 
approximation.  
The likelihood of a claim arising out of a new development is calculated first. 
Four factors were used to determine the likelihood of a claim being generated from 
new development in a county. First, was the number of real estate transactions that 
occurred in the county in a year. Second, was the regulatory environment with in the 
county. Third, was the number of parcels of land in the county. Fourth, was the 
existence of zoning and subdivision regulations. 
The first step in determining the number of lawsuits based on new 
development in Georgia if the proposed act was in place is to determine the volume 
of real-estate transactions in a county in a given year. The yearly number of real-
estate transactions per county was estimated by taking the three-year average of real 
estate transactions from 2003-2005. The data were taken from sales audit reports 
from the Georgia Auditors office (See Appendix B for a detailed description of the 
data). 
The second factor considered in estimating the likelihood of a claim being 
brought under the proposed act is the regulatory environment in the county.  In South 
Carolina, the panel did a telephone survey and relied on local expertise to determine 
whether the regulatory environment in the county was strict, intermediate, or 
relatively loose. I use a Department of Community Affairs (DCA) map of counties to 
characterize the regulatory enforcement regime. (See Appendix C for the maps). In 
some counties in Georgia only the municipalities issue building permits. In others, 
the county just issues building permits but does not enforce the building codes. A 
third group of counties issue building permits and enforce the building codes.  These 
enforcement designations were used to determine the strictness of county regulation.  
If the county issues building permits and enforces the building code, it is 
considered a strict regulatory environment county. If the county did not issue building 
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permits or enforce the building codes, it is considered a low regulatory environment 
county. If it either issued building permits or enforced building codes, it is an 
intermediate regulatory environment county.7 
The third factor is the number of parcels of land in a county. Counties with 
fewer parcels were deemed by the South Carolina experts to be less likely to 
encounter litigation under the proposed act. In general, rural counties have fewer 
parcels than urban counties. Urban counties, like Fulton County, home to the city of 
Atlanta, are likely to have more new development and land use changes. Rural 
counties are more likely to maintain the status quo and experience slower rates of 
development and change (Fishkind & Associates 1998). Using Fishkind’s approach, I 
assigned a scaling factor to each county in Georgia depending on its number of 
parcels. Counties with the most parcels received the lowest scaling factor and are the 
most likely to incur litigation under the new act. The scaling factor for these high 
parcel counties is ten. Counties with the fewest parcels were the least likely to incur 
litigation under the proposed new act and have the highest scaling factor of 100. The 
intermediate counties were assigned a scaling factor of 20 (Fishkind & Associates 
1998). 
The Fourth factor considered by the South Carolina panel was whether a 
county currently had zoning or subdivision regulations. In the South Carolina study a 
county is given a ten percent chance of a claim being filed if it had zoning 
regulations. Another ten percent was added if it had subdivision regulations. If it had 
neither, the county received a score of zero.8 
In Georgia the third and fourth factors for estimating the likelihood of a claim 
arising in a county are somewhat linked. The counties deemed least likely to incur 
litigation costs were those with fewer than 30,000 parcels. Georgia has 126 counties 
with fewer than 30,000 parcels, 53 do not have zoning, while 36 do not have 
subdivision regulations.  The next group of counties is those that have between 
                                                          
7 The Georgia DCA also has different requirements for planning based on current county 
population. So the regulatory environment is linked partially with population.  Rural counties with 
small population are less likely to enforce codes thus they are deemed less strict, and the DCA 
requires less regulation of them. 
8 In some South Carolina counties partial zoning existed. In Georgia the county is considered to 
have full zoning or none at all.  
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30,001 and 60,000 parcels. These counties have an intermediate chance of incurring 
litigation.  In Georgia 21 counties fall into this category. All 21 have zoning and only 
one does not have subdivision regulations.  The third group is counties with over 
60,000 parcels. There are 12 counties in Georgia in this category; all have zoning and 
subdivision regulations.  
Fulton County will be used to demonstrate how the number of potential 
claims filed is calculated. The first factor needed is the number of parcels on which 
new development is likely to occur.  For Fulton County, that is 18,828 parcels (See 
Appendix D for county parcel counts).  Next factors two and four are considered. 
Fulton County is considered a strict regulatory county, and has zoning regulations 
and subdivision rules. Fulton County has an initial score of 30 percent based on these 
factors. Factor three is determined by the number of parcels in a county. Since Fulton 
County has over 60,000 parcels, it has a low scaling factor of ten. Dividing 30 
percent by the scaling factor gives three percent. This represents the expected percent 
of new development in Fulton County that will generate claims under the proposed 
act in its first year.  In Fulton County, the estimated number of claims brought under 
the proposed act is 565, three percent of 18,828. 
The process is repeated for every county in Georgia. County values are 
summed giving a state value of 5,750 (See Appendix D).  This is the number of 
claims that is expected to be generated from new development in Georgia in the first 
year if the proposed property rights law were in place.   
The other source of claims under the act is existing property owners who 
modify the structures or uses of their property. Here the chances of litigation based on 
the proposed act are lower, because it is likely that the property may have vested 
rights or the current use is already allowed (Fishkind & Associates 1998). To account 
for the smaller chance of claims arising for this group, the scaling factor is reduced by 
a factor of ten.  To calculate the number of expected claims from existing owners the 
average number of new sales is subtracted from the number of parcels in the county. 
The expected percent of claims is divided by the appropriate scaling factor times ten.  
Again using Fulton County as an example, the number of parcels used to 
calculate the existing claims is 259,798. To figure the relevant percent of parcels that 
are expected to file a claim, 30 percent is divided by the new scaling factor of 100. 
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This gives 779 expected claims filed for existing property owners in Fulton County. 
Again the process is repeated for all the counties in the state. For Georgia, the total 
amount of claims based on modifications to existing structures or uses of property is 
5,944 (See Appendix D).    
Note that the number of potential claims under a property rights law will 
likely exceed the number of variances filed, due to the differences between the two 
procedures. Generally, a variance is granted at the discretion of the local government. 
While anyone may file for one, there is no criterion set out that if met would 
guarantee an applicant will receive the variance. A property rights statute creates a 
cause of action. If the property owner establishes the elements of the claim, an 
inordinate burden on the use of property due to a covered offending law, the 
government is obligated to pay damages.  
A hypothetical example may be helpful to illustrate these differences. A 
developer purchases several adjoining parcels in a neighborhood zoned for single-
family homes. He may seek a variance to put a 20-story apartment building on the 
recently purchased tracts. He would have little chance of getting such a variance as 
the use clearly is incompatible with the established zoning and local residents would 
oppose it. However, under a Harris Act style property rights statute, such a claim 
would have to be paid if the developer could establish the elements of the cause of 
action. He would need to show that the zoning regulation was covered under the act 
and its existence inordinately burdened his property because it prohibited him from 
erecting a 20-story apartment building. Local residents affected by a settlement 
waiving the zoning law or compensation to the developer would have little input in 
the process. The developer has a better chance of securing either permission to build 
the apartment building or compensation under a Harris Style property rights law than 
if he could only apply for a variance. This is because a Harris Act style property 
rights law lowers the standard to prove a regulatory taking and removes the local 
government discretion and public input present in a variance request.  Thus, it is 
likely that the number of claims filed under such an act will exceed the number of 
variances traditionally requested. The next section estimates litigation expenses. 
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Litigation Expenses 
The number of claims is one piece of the litigation cost estimate. The second 
is the total amount of litigation expenses generated from those claims. I adopt all the 
litigation expense estimates generated by the South Carolina panel described below in 
my estimate for Georgia.  
The South Carolina panel estimated that most claims settle. The range of 
claims that are actually litigated was estimated to be between 10-50 percent. The 
estimated midpoint was set at 20 percent. Thus, the total number of claims litigated in 
Georgia would be 2,339 per year, twenty percent of the 11,694 total potential claims. 
The South Carolina panel estimated that attorneys, expert witnesses, and other costs 
of litigation would range between $5,000 and $100,000. The panel estimated the 
midpoint at $52,500. 
The South Carolina panel estimated the amount of awards and the likelihood 
of a claimant prevailing. It assumed the landowner won half the time and the 
government the other half. The range of awards to the landowner was $1,000 to 
$100,000. The midpoint was estimated at $52,700. 
The South Carolina bill allowed attorneys’ fees to be awarded in certain 
special cases. The government would be liable to pay the claimants’ attorneys fees if 
it did not submit a bona fide settlement offer within 180 days and the claimant 
eventually prevailed at trial.  The South Carolina panel estimated that this would 
occur in ten percent of the cases. The landowner was liable for the government’s 
attorney’s fees if she refused to accept a bona fide settlement offer from the 
government and was awarded less than that offer after a trial. This was estimated to 
occur in one percent of the cases.  
 
Total Expenses 
Table 1 illustrates the first-year estimated cost to landowners as well as state 
and local governments in Georgia if the assumed property rights law is passed. 
(These figures are inflation adjusted to 2006 dollars; see Appendix E for a county 
breakdown).  Due to the high cost of filing claims, as well as litigation costs, the 
landowners’  estimated  net  cost  would  be roughly $159 million. The state and local 
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TABLE 1: ESTIMATED FIRST-YEAR COST TO GEORGIA  
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS REFORM STATUTE 
Category Amount*
Awards to Landowners $75,981,319
Cost of Litigation Landowners $151,385,931
Cost of Filing Claim Landowners $90,110,673
Net Cost Landowners $158,702,917
Net Cost Government $279,955,839
Total Cost Georgia $438,658,756
*Amounts are in 2006 dollars. 
 
governments of Georgia would incur an estimated net cost of approximately $280 
million to defend against these claims, as well as pay awards to landowners.  The 
landowners’ awards of approximately $76 million represent 27 percent of the state’s 
total net cost.  The annual costs to the state and claimants would likely diminish in 
subsequent years as the landowners and local governments adjusted to the new law. 
However, costs would still likely be substantial as new property owners and changing 
land use patterns combined to put economically viable uses and regulation in conflict.   
Table 2 illustrates the first-year estimated cost to landowners and the state at 
the estimated lowest cost for the litigation expenses from Appendix A.  Using these 
lower estimates the cost to the landowner for filing a claim would be $2,500. The cost 
to the government for a response would be $250. In addition, it would only cost 
$5,000 each for the government and the landowner to take the case to trial. Awards 
are kept the same, as there is no reason to believe the price of land has changed. In 
this scenario landowners have a net benefit of $26 million.  State and local 
governments have a net cost of $95 million. The total cost to the state is $68 million. 
However, of the $76 million in awards to landowners, $50 million goes to filing and 
litigation costs.   
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TABLE 2: LOW FIRST-YEAR COST ESTIMATE OF PROPERTY  
RIGHTS REFORM STATUTE FOR GEORGIA 
Category Amount*
Awards to Landowners $75,981,319
Cost of Litigation Landowners $14,417,708
Cost of Filing Claim Landowners $36,044,269
Net Cost Landowners -$26,168,139
Net Cost Government $94,652,251
Total Cost Georgia $68,484,111
*Amounts are in 2006 dollars. 
 
Depending on how the new Georgia law is written, the amount of litigation in 
the first year could mushroom as was anticipated in South Carolina or remain 
relatively unchanged as in Florida. As was earlier noted, Georgia falls between 
Florida and South Carolina for comprehensive planning. If the new law is prospective 
only, an area with lots of regulation may not issue many new laws and thus will 
generate few claims. This would follow the pattern in Florida which already had 
extensive planning and zoning in place and thus did not experience an upturn in 
litigation generated from the Harris Act.  
In Georgia there are 12 counties with over 60,000 parcels and all these are in 
or near large metropolitan areas. While these counties are similar to Florida counties, 
in that they already have land use and planning statutes on the books, it is also 
possible that these large metropolitan counties could generate as much litigation as 
was anticipated in South Carolina. If Georgia were to treat any reauthorization or 
amendments to existing plans as new law under the act, then litigation would likely 
result. Also, if a new law was written to cover certain regulations retroactively, like 
Oregon’s Measure 37, then it is likely that these 12 counties with the most parcels 
and regulations will generate the most litigation.  
Georgia, like South Carolina, is also experiencing population growth, 
particularly in the suburban counties of large metropolitan areas such as Atlanta. 
Thus, Georgia’s urban fringe counties may generate considerable litigation. Some of 
these counties are currently low-population low-density rural areas and are changing 
Property Rights Reform:  A Fiscal Analysis    
 
 
 19
to high population urban residential areas.9  Managing the rapid growth in these fast 
growing counties will require changes in the land use and planning laws. These 
additional regulations would likely trigger litigation under a property rights law.  
Even if Georgia does not generate as much litigation as the South Carolina 
estimate, the cost to the state would still not be nominal. If Georgia generates one-
third fewer cases under the proposed new act as South Carolina, the cost to the state 
and claimants would still be $146 million for the first year under the normal litigation 
cost assumptions and $22 million for the first year using the low cost litigation 
estimate.  
Another possible outcome of a property rights statute is a decline in new 
planning and zoning statutes. This would also have a cost, particularly if local 
residents would prefer planning and zoning, but local governments can’t afford to pay 
claims. This is an area of future research.   
 
                                                          
9 Wolf Creek Development in Carroll County is an example. In a plan submitted to the county, a 
timber company seeks to develop over 10,000 acres of forest land. The plan spans some 35 years 
and will eventually house an estimated 56,000 people.  
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IV. Eminent Domain Reform 
 
The Supreme Courts ruling in Kelo was a rallying point for private property 
rights advocates. The case gave national attention to the abuses of eminent domain by 
local governments. Georgia responded by reforming its eminent domain statutes. 
Georgia’s new eminent domain law protects private property owners from assertions 
of eminent domain strictly for economic development; however, exceptions are made 
for blighted areas.  State utility companies still enjoy complete eminent domain 
powers.  This section discusses the legislative history and some background 
information that motivated the consideration of eminent domain reform. 
Eminent domain has its origins in the historical doctrine that the state is the 
ultimate sovereign authority over all land. Cities and counties and their designees 
wield the power of eminent domain by delegation from the state. The eminent domain 
doctrine allows an approved government entity or utility to assert this authority for 
public projects if just compensation is paid to the private owner. An additional 
modern rationale for the doctrine is that private property owners should not be able to 
hold back projects or force excessive costs on to the state for projects that benefit the 
public.  In practice, eminent domain functions as a tool of last resort to keep 
necessary state and local projects going forward and on budget (Cooter and Ulen 
2003). Most disputes regarding eminent domain are about the amount of just 
compensation (Southern Company 2006).  Courts are used to settle these disputes 
over value. 
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V. The Kelo Case 
 
The issue in the Kelo case was the requirement that local governments 
exercise the power of eminent domain for a public purpose. The basic facts of the 
case are as follows. Susette Kelo owned a house along a stretch of the Thames River 
in New London, Connecticut. The city of New London, in an attempt to bolster its 
sagging economic fortunes, compiled a comprehensive redevelopment plan for the 
Thames riverfront area that included public and private elements. The city planned to 
sell part of the land it condemned, including Susette Kelo’s parcel, to undetermined 
private parties as per the plan. The issue was: Does the condemnation of nonblighted 
private property, that is to be sold to unknown private developers, in compliance with 
an economic development plan, fall under the public purpose doctrine? The Supreme 
Court held that such an exercise of eminent domain did satisfy the public purpose 
doctrine.10    
In response to Kelo, forty-seven states considered reforming their eminent 
domain legislation. The reaction to Kelo by state legislatures is an attempt to prevent 
local governments from taking nonblighted private property for the stated public 
purpose of economic development and selling it to a private entity for private use. In 
Georgia the legislature passed several reforms to the State’s eminent domain laws. 
The new law prohibits local governments from taking private property solely for 
economic development in nonblighted areas. These reforms also tightened the 
definition of blight, and shifted the burden of proof to the government to prove the 
property is blighted.  
 
                                                          
10 It is beyond the scope of this report to discuss the legal merits of the case (see Adomeit 2005, 
Wiener 2005 for a summary). 
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VI. Fiscal Impact of Eminent Domain Law 
 
The fiscal impact of the new eminent domain legislation in Georgia is likely 
to be small as it should not dramatically alter the use of eminent domain throughout 
the state. Local governments are still allowed to exercise eminent domain for slum 
and blighted property. Also, almost all the entities that had been given the power of 
eminent domain still retain it. In addition, Georgia is not a state that is perceived to 
abuse the power of eminent domain.  
It is difficult to calculate the cost of eminent domain in Georgia. First, the 
power of eminent domain is vested in several governments and agencies including: 
the state, counties, cities and public utility companies. Second, the threat of eminent 
domain is often enough to coerce parties to sell without actually having to formally 
go through the eminent domain process. Georgia Power, Georgia’s electric utility 
company, estimated that over the past five years less than three percent of all the 
property it acquired for line expansion, construction, etc., required using formal 
eminent domain (Southern Company 2006). 
Georgia is also considered a model state in its use of eminent domain. In a 
study done by the Institute of Justice, an advocacy group for limiting the use of 
eminent domain, Georgia had no instances in which eminent domain was used to take 
private property for private gain in the period 1998-2002 (CastleCoalition 2006). On 
its most recent map, the advocacy group, Castle Keepers, lists the Stockbridge case as 
the sole incidence of a local government in Georgia using eminent domain for private 
gain.11 Since local governments in Georgia did not abuse their powers of eminent 
domain in the past, it is likely that the current legislation will have very minor effects 
on government actions in the future. Thus, the fiscal cost to the state and local 
government of this reform is likely to be small.  
The constitutional amendment that took the power of eminent domain from 
local  housing  authorities might have more fiscal impact on local governments. In the  
                                                          
11 The City of Stockbridge, Georgia condemned eight parcels of property in August of 2005, for its 
town center project. The city intends to sell several of the condemned parcels to private 
developers. In the September of 2006, several of the condemned property owners filed suit 
contesting the use of eminent domain by the city. At trial, the city appraiser established that the 
properties were not blighted. 
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past, housing authorities had the power of eminent domain. They used this power to 
stitch together rundown housing and abandoned lots usually in low-income areas and 
to facilitate redevelopment. The power of eminent domain is useful to get clean title 
to and allow redevelopment of essentially abandoned property. The constitutional 
amendment requires that the authorities make their requests through the appropriate 
city council or county commission.  This adds cost to the procedure and may impede 
the efforts of these authorities to clean up blighted areas. However, it is not likely to 
have a major impact on land use or local government planning (Peters 2006).   
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VII. Conclusion  
 
While eminent domain is likely to have a minimal fiscal effect, regulatory 
takings reform has the potential to be very expensive for the state of Georgia. The 
estimated first-year cost to the state and claimants is $438 million. Even if litigation 
were not generated at the predicted rate, other harmful effects of a new takings law 
would still exist. Such a law would likely decrease local government’s planning and 
zoning efforts, even if regulations were favored by the majority of the residents.  
 Georgia does face a policy problem, the residents of North Georgia are being 
asked to bear an ever-increasing burden to maintain the integrity of the states water 
supply. Solutions exist for North Georgia’s residents. However, a property rights 
statute is a very blunt instrument for dealing with this issue and would likely have 
many unintended negative statewide consequences. In Oregon, Measure 37 was 
marketed as a way to allow rural landowners to build homes for themselves and their 
families. However, once the measure passed, it opened the door for a host of 
unintended costs, consequences, and beneficiaries. Additional policy options to try to 
solve this tug of war over water and property rights in North Georgia will be a topic 
of future research.  
The eminent domain reforms are likely to have a small fiscal effect on 
Georgia. Georgia was not considered a state in which the power of eminent domain 
was abused, thus local governments will likely adapt to the state’s new guidelines.  
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Appendix A 
 
Notification Costs 1998 Low High
Appraisal   $2,000 $20,000
Attorney's Fees   $500 $10,000
Other experts   $0 $20,000
Other costs   $0 $10,000
Total   $2,500 $60,000
Midpoint  $6,250     
    
Gov. Cost for Claim 1998 Low High
Notice of claim   $50 $500
Written offer   $100 $1,000
Appraisal   $0 $10,000
Other costs   $0 $10,000
Additional staff time   $100 $10,000
Total   $250 $31,500
Midpoint  $3,175     
    
  Low High
Litigation Costs 1998   $5,000 $100,000
Midpoint  $52,500  
 
Awards 1998  $1,000 $100,000
Midpoint  $52,700     
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Appendix B 
 
To estimate a reasonable number for potential new yearly sales for Georgia, I 
obtained the 2003, 2004 and 2005 sales ratios studies form the Georgia State 
Auditors Office. The sales ratio study for each county lists the number of real-estate 
transactions per year by class: residential, agricultural, commercial, and industrial. 
The new sales figures used in this report   include all four categories.  If the county 
had more than 1,000 residential transactions in a given year, the ratio study only 
sampled 20 percent of them. Thus any figures of a 1,000 or more were multiplied by 
five. Some counties were on the border and were very close to 1,000 residential 
transactions. By looking at the data over the three years, I determined whether it had 
less than 1,000 transactions or whether it had several thousand transactions. Only 
Thomas County ended up having to be adjusted while listing less than 1,000 
transactions.  
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Appendix C.  County Planning Levels Map  
 
 
 
County Construction Codes 
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